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The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew
Exposición del embajador Bilahari Kausikan en la conferencia 
"The big ideas of Lee Kuan Yew", realizada en la Universidad 
Nacional de Singapur el 16 de septiembre de 2013.
There is something more than a little incongruous about 
tagging a conference »The Big Ideas of Mr Lee Kuan Yew«. 
The term ‘big ideas’ generally connotes some overarching 
framework or theory. Yet he once told a journalist: »I am not 
great on philosophy and theories. I am interested in them, but 
my life is not guided by philosophy or theories. I get things 
done ….« This is particularly so with regard to his approach 
to geopolitics and international relations, an area to which 
more than a fair share of nonsense has been attached under 
the guise of theory. It is more appropriate to talk about Mr 
Lee’s approach towards international relations and geopolitics.
An international relations theorist would no doubt call 
Mr Lee a realist. But no simplistic label can do justice to the 
eclectic complexity of his approach towards international 
relations and geopolitics. I suspect that if anyone were fool-
hardy enough to ask Mr Lee which of the main schools of 
international relations –realism, institutionalism, liberalism, 
constructivism– most influenced him, his reply, if he were in a 
good mood and if he had even heard of these theories, would 
be ‘all of the above and none of the above’. 
Mr Lee is above all an empiricist. He saw the world for 
what it is and never mistook his hopes or fears for reality. Mr 
Lee is not devoid of idealism. After all, he risked his life in 
the struggle against the communist United Front for ideals. 
Still he knew that in world affairs, as in all fields of human 
endeavour, not all desirable values are compatible or can be 
simultaneously realised. 
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I think Mr Lee would not, for example, disagree with 
the proposition that a world governed by international law 
and international organizations would be preferable for a 
small country like Singapore. But he would certainly ques-
tion whether a world of sovereign states of vastly disparate 
power could really ever be such a world. He understood 
that international order is the prerequisite for international 
law and organization. So while you may work towards an 
ideal and must stand firm on basic principles, you settle for 
what is practical at any point of time, rather than embark on 
Quixotic quests.
Mr Lee’s ‘big idea’ was Singapore. On that he always 
thought big: Singapore as we know it today would not other-
wise exist. In so far as any central organizing principle infused 
his geopolitical thinking, it is a laser-like focus on Singapore’s 
national interest. He saw the world canvas whole. But unlike 
too many self-styled ‘statesmen’, Mr Lee never succumbed 
to the temptation of capering about on the world stage for 
its own sake. When he expressed an opinion, it was always 
to some purpose, even though the purpose may not always 
have been immediately apparent to everyone. He looked at 
the world strategically with a broad and long term vision; he 
played chess not draughts.
His geopolitical thought is based on an unsentimental view 
of human nature and power; a view shaped by experience, 
particularly, as he on several occasions has said, his experience 
of the Japanese occupation. His analyses are characterized by 
the hard headed precision with which he zeroed in on the core 
of any situation, undistracted by the peripheral. He expressed 
his ideas directly without cant of any kind.
This is harder to do than you may think and consequently 
rare. Fluffythought and weasely expression are more usual 
in diplomacy and the analysis of international relations. For 
proof of the scarcity of clear thinking on international issues, 
just peruse the op-ed and international news pages of any 
major newspaper with an objective eye. And consider, for 
example, the many knots western commentators and policy-
makers have tied themselves into over Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt 
and now over Syria. Wishful, ideologically driven thinking, 
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loose talk and the advocacy of impossible or incompatible 
goals abounds. 
The disciplined clarity of his thought and expression was 
one of the primary sources of the influence Mr Lee wielded, 
disproportionate for the leader of a small country like Singa-
pore. His views were valued because they were unvarnished 
and gave a fresh and unique perspective. He said things that 
leaders of much larger and more powerful countries may well 
have thought and may have liked to say, but for one reason or 
another, could not themselves prudently say. And so he made 
Singapore relevant. His support for the Vietnam war at a time 
when it was politically unpopular -- a war he believed unwin-
nable but nevertheless vital to buy time for non-communist 
Southeast Asia to put its house in order -- being a case in point, 
as was his support for the US presence in East Asia long before 
it became fashionable in our neighbourhood.
Mr Lee once memorably said that he was interested in 
being correct rather than being politically correct. Naturally, 
he was not always correct. International developments are 
intrinsically unpredictable and nobody can ever be always 
correct. But he was more often than not on target and when 
he was not, was never too proud to change his position. So 
when he spoke even great powers listened. They may not 
always have liked what they heard, but they listened and 
more importantly, sometimes acted on what they heard. In his 
memoirs Mr Lee has recounted his 1978 meeting with Deng 
Xiaoping and how he got him to drop Chinese support for 
communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. So let me tell you 
a less well known story.
In 1981, at the International Conference on Kampuchea 
held at the UN, the US was poised to sell out Singapore’s and 
ASEAN’s interests in favour of China’s interest to see a return 
of the Khmer Rouge regime. The then Assistant Secretary of 
State in charge of China policy even threatened our Foreign 
Minister that there would be »blood on the floor« if we did 
not relent. We held firm. The next year, Mr Lee travelled to 
Washington DC and in a meeting with the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, described America’s China policy as 
‘amateurish’. Word rapidly spread. As the young desk of-
ficer who took notes for that meeting, I was bemused by the 
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spectacle of the Assistant Secretary frantically scrambling to 
find out what exactly Mr Lee had said. I don’t know if it was 
coincidental, but the very next year the Assistant Secretary in 
question was appointed Ambassador to Indonesia; an impor-
tant position, but one in which he no longer held sway over 
China policy. And when his new appointment was announced, 
the gentleman anxiously enquired through an intermediary 
if Mr Lee had told then President Soeharto anything about 
him. He was reassured and served honourably in Indonesia.
I do not recount this incident in US-Singapore relations 
merely for the trite and possibly redundant purpose of illus-
trating Mr Lee’s influence. The moral of the story is his ap-
proach to diplomacy; an approach which he hammered into 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but which is not sufficiently 
understood by the general public or even some sections of 
our establishment. Diplomacy is not about being nice, polite 
or agreeable. It is more fundamentally about protecting and 
promoting the country’s interests, preferably by being nice 
but if necessary by other appropriate means. 
In 1968, Mr Lee turned down a direct appeal by former 
President Soeharto to pardon two Indonesian marines who 
had been sentenced to death for planting a bomb during 
Konfrontasi that killed several Singaporeans. He could not 
have done otherwise without conceding that the small must 
always defer to the big and irretrievably compromising our 
sovereignty. A Jakarta mob then sacked our Embassy and 
threatened to kill our Ambassador. But a few years later in 
1973, he did not shy away from placing flowers on the graves 
of the two marines. Both actions -- standing firm on funda-
mental principle even at risk of conflict and making a gracious 
gesture once the principle had been established -- were equally 
important in setting the foundations of the relationship we 
today enjoy with Indonesia. He once told an Israeli general 
who had helped start the SAF that Singapore had learnt two 
things from Israel: how to be strong, and how not to use our 
strength; meaning that it was necessary to get along with 
neighbours and that no country can live in perpetual conflict 
with its neighbours.
But Mr Lee had no illusions about the challenges fac-
ing a Chinese majority Singapore permanently situated in a 
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Southeast Asia in which the Chinese are typically a less than 
fully welcome minority. His greatest mistake was perhaps, 
during the period when Singapore was part of Malaysia, to 
underestimate the lengths to which the Malaysian leadership 
would go to defend Malay dominance and privileges and led 
to what was politely termed ‘Separation’. But it turned out 
well for us, better in all probability than if we had remained 
in Malaysia. At any rate, it was not a mistake that he would 
ever make again. 
The basic issue in Singapore’s relations with our neighbours 
is existential: the implicit challenge a successful Chinese major-
ity Singapore organized on the basis of multiracial meritocracy 
by its very existence poses to contiguous systems organized 
on different and irreconcilable principles. This is sometimes 
dismissed as ‘historical baggage’ that will fade with time. But 
it is really about the dynamic between two different types of 
political systems which once shared a common history but 
have since evolved in very different directions. It is not easy to 
envisage the fundamental differences ever fading away, even 
if time blunts their sharpest edges. 
Still, even when differences were at their keenest, it did not 
prevent Mr Lee from working with Malaysia (and Indonesia) 
based on the pragmatic pursuit of common interests. It is no 
secret that the relationship between Mr Lee and Dr Mahathir 
the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, was often testy and 
fraught with history. Less well known is the fact that until 
the 2010 agreement on railway land, the most significant 
Singapore-Malaysia agreement since our independence was 
the 1990 Water Agreement concluded between Dr Mahathir 
and Mr Lee, then still Prime Minister. Among other things, it 
provided for the construction of Linggiu Dam.
The incongruity of Singapore in Southeast Asia is the 
central geopolitical reality from which flowed the constants 
in Mr Lee’s approach towards geopolitics and key decisions. 
These include, among other things: the early investment in 
ASEAN as a stabilizing mechanism at a time when it was 
still uncertain whether ASEAN would survive; his emphasis 
on balance and the imperative of involving all major powers 
in regional affairs rather than acquiesce in ‘regional solu-
tions to regional problems’; the necessity of anchoring the 
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US presence in Southeast Asia, including the offer of the use 
of our facilities after US forces were no longer welcome in 
Subic Bay and Clark Airbase in the Philippines; the decision 
to look forwards in relations with Japan and to forgive if not 
forget, despite his own bitter experiences during the Japanese 
occupation; never giving up on India despite his continuing 
scepticism about its governance; a non-ideological approach 
to working with the former Soviet Union whenever possible, 
despite his anti-communism; and the decision to be the last 
Southeast Asian country to establish formal diplomatic rela-
tions with China despite his early recognition of the inevitable 
growth of China’s influence and the close personal relations 
he enjoyed with many Chinese leaders.
No leader, however personally brilliant an individual, can 
be internationally influential if he only leads a barren rock. Mr 
Lee was influential because Singapore is successful. The core 
operating principles Mr Lee established still form the basis 
of our foreign policy, although of course their application is 
continually adjusted to changing circumstances. This should 
not be surprising since we cannot choose our geopolitical 
situation and small countries have limited options. But the 
question inevitably arises: can we continue to be internation-
ally effective and relevant in a post-Lee Kuan Yew era?
Many years ago, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs com-
missioned a study on how Singapore could continue to have 
a close relationship with China after Mr Lee’s network of 
personal contacts with Chinese leaders was no longer avail-
able. I must emphasize that the study was not conducted by 
a Foreign Service Officer because after lengthy consideration, 
the conclusion was - have more Lee Kuan Yews!
This was not exactly very helpful. But I am not entirely 
pessimistic. Mr Lee relinquished executive authority more 
than twenty years ago; we have in effect already been in a 
post-Lee Kuan Yew era for quite some time. There will never 
be another Lee Kuan Yew. But we are still and can remain 
internationally relevant so long as Singapore is successful 
and we do not lose the habits of mind – supple, pragmatic, 
disciplined and unsentimental long-term thinking focused on 
the national interest – the core principles and the clarity of 
expression that Mr Lee instilled in what is today a far more 
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institutionalized foreign policy system. So long as we retain 
this edge, our views will continue to be sought by countries 
large and small, many of whom seek to emulate our policies. 
It is however not to be taken for granted that we can in 
fact retain this edge. Domestic politics in Singapore is becom-
ing more complicated. Foreign policy will sooner or later be 
the subject of domestic debates. This is not necessarily a bad 
thing provided -- and this is a crucial condition -- foreign 
policy debates occur within nationally agreed parameters of 
what is and is not possible or desirable for a small country. 
This is difficult under the best of circumstances and even more 
difficult for a country with only a very short shared history. 
Already and all too often I see the irrelevant or the impos-
sible being held up as worthy of emulation; I see our vulner-
abilities being dismissed or downplayed; and I see only a 
superficial understanding of how the world really works in 
civil society and other groups who aspire to prescribe alternate 
foreign policies. Most dangerously of all, I see the first signs, 
as yet still faint but alas, unmistakable, of failure by some to 
resist the temptation to use foreign policy as a tool of partisan 
politics. Whatever the dissatisfaction with the government, 
however great the desire for change, Singaporeans should not 
lose sight of the old adage, somewhat clichéd but not invalid: 
domestic politics should stop at water’s edge. Even the biggest 
and most powerful of countries disregards this to their cost 
and chagrin; for small countries disregard could prove fatal. 
Fortunately the situation is not yet irreversible. 
